


# WHAT HAS THE NATO STRATCOM COE IN LATVIA BEEN INVOLVED IN?

WilkinsonJ August 26, 2016 News, World 312 Views

The NATO StratCom has been busy with issuing such proxy notes. Just look, it's adorable,



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**PERSPECTIVES FOR COLLABORATION WITHIN THE PROGRAM OF INFORMATION COOPERATION LAUNCHED BY THE NATO STRATCOM COE IN LATVIA**

In order to create information support on the internal political front it is necessary to cover the following issues:

1. Systemic denial of versions of what is happening in the conflict zone of Eastern Ukraine which are different from the ones that have been accepted by the democratic community.
2. Dissemination of information about recruitment of Ukrainian and European journalists by terrorist organizations of "DNF" and "LNR" for involving in information war against Ukraine.
3. Provision of information on upsurge in the activities of Luhansk and Donetsk guerrillas waging war against the Russian Federation (RF). Liquidation of some leaders of separatists, attacks against occupants near such cities as Atkratsyt, Alchevsk, Brianka, Krasnodon, Kramyt Luch (Druzhynin), Stahanev, Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as, dropping of propaganda leaflets and ideological actions with the occupied population should lead to mass uprising against illegal DNR and LNR authorities.
4. Dissemination of information about the increase in activities of Russian and the RF-sponsored separatists' forces in the Donbas, as well as, increase Russian regulars' casualties because of failed offensive blows and redeployment of additional troops there.
5. Dissemination of information about the need to temporarily close checkpoints along the border with DNR and LNR in order to stop payments of social benefits to separatists who get massive payment of benefits from Ukrainian social security institutions. Mainstreaming attention to relevant petitions.
6. Provision of information concerning human rights violation, protest actions and lack of state support targeting the most vulnerable sections of the population, including public employees in the annexed Crimea.
7. Dissemination of information on speedy and full discontinuance of energy cooperation between Ukraine and Russia.

In order to create information support on the external political front it is necessary to cover the following issues:

1. Dissemination of information about failed Russia's policies towards Ukraine that led to the RF economic and political crisis, reduction in the State budget, reserve stores, and, as a result, inevitable problems with payments to budget workers in the following year.
2. Dissemination of information about the negative impact of the Crimea's annexation on the RF economic, political and social situation, particularly in the light of new sanctions, imposed against the Southern Federal Area.

3. Dissemination of information about the lack of the RF funds for maintenance of the Crimean critical infrastructures, including such projects within the RF Special Federal Program as construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge, other road transport arteries, as well as, laying water lines and supply cable across the Kerch Strait.
4. Advancing the calls of foreign politicians for maintaining and strengthening sanctions against the RF because of systematic violations by Russia of the Minsk peace agreements.
5. Coverage of developments regarding those RF military operations in Syria and Ukraine that have the negative impact on economic, political and social situation in the country and lead to a rise in the level of casualties among Russian forces and in military expenditures.
6. Dissemination of information about US-Danish negotiations on the blocking of The Nord Stream 2 within the program of support to Ukraine's economy and prevention of monopolistic practices at European market of hydrocarbons.
7. Dissemination of information about initiating negotiations by the Russian Federation with the EU concerning Moscow's steps to help resolve migration crisis in Europe in exchange for the EU rejection of additional sanctions' imposition as a result of its legal recognition of the RF occupation of some part of Ukraine.

In order to create information support on the specific political front it is necessary to carry out the following activities related to election of the State authorities in subjects of the Russian Federation to be held on September 18, 2016, and local government elections in local administration centers of municipal formations which are assessed to be constituent entities of the Russian Federation, as well as, the 2018 presidential election:

1. Reproduction of compromising materials that severely criticize Russian politicians, which is a part of information support of oppositional candidates during the elections to be held on September 18, 2016.
2. Dissemination of information about the backstage decision of Russian political elite not to hold elections on September 18, 2016, as well as, the 2018 presidential election because of strengthening and extending the sanctions regime.
3. Dissemination of information about the crackdown on mass demonstrations timed to this September elections and directed against the Crimean occupation authorities, by regular troops of the Russian Federation.
4. Dissemination of information about the use of administrative offices' advantages in favor of the United Russia Party during the forthcoming elections, made through those Ukrainians who are involved in construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge, the Zenit Arena Stadium and the Vostochny Cosmodrome (Eastern Spaceport).
5. Dissemination of information about the closure of road links between Poland and Russia in 2017 because of a legislative restriction of the current Russian law in the field of international transportation, material losses in Russian business, exit from the market by most of the European producers and increase in the price of products imported in Russia.
6. Reproduction of media materials about the United Russia Party's agreement on distribution of billion-dollar state contracts among major Russian companies which are sponsors of the ruling party's re-election campaign and elections on September 18, 2016.
7. Dissemination of information about Russian government's decision to close Special Economic Zones, the construction of which cost over 150 billion rubles from the state budget, because of their ineffectiveness.
8. Dissemination of information which features links to contacts with Russian power structures that the priority of the I. Yarovaya's and V. Ozerov's bill adoption is determined by the need for monitoring anti-government sentiments among Russian citizens in advance of the elections.

9. Gatherings of Ukrainian activists in support of Russian opposition's actions against the package of the Yanukovich's laws, failed Moscow's foreign policy, the increase in tariffs of communal services, delays in paying wages to employees in the public sector, changes to the RF Education Law, the elimination of scholarships, and also in support of the so-called 'Bolotnaya' opposition and obtaining the political autonomy for subjects of the Russian Federation. Provocation and confrontation between Russian government supporters and oppositional forces should be organized during agitation meetings and the United Russia deputies' visits to their constituents.
10. Assistance to Russian opposition in the conduct of protest actions near the United Russia Party's offices demanding funds to cover costs of participation in meetings for support of power, activities on the subject of the electoral campaign organization and discrediting of Moscow regime's supporters.
11. Organization of provocative acts along the border with the Republic of Crimea, the blockage of transportation routes and energy supply for the Crimean Peninsula.

Now it has become clear who is the Ukraine's expert adviser general on information and diversionary warfare.

The thing that is still vague is the document purpose. Ukrainians had been shock working at all its points well before these guidelines issued by their NATO sponsors. They have been easily recognizable at any news site, for the Ukrainian coach-based Forces are the most ignorant of all those writing commentaries at the Guardian, the Daily Mail, the Washington Post, and any other official editions. They even manage to write with a noticeable Eastern-Slavic accent. At the same time they follow closely all topics mentioned in this note.

It seems that this document has been produced with the only purpose to justify the Alliance' investments into the work of such good-for-nothing unit as the NATO StratCom in Latvia. It doesn't contain any news or constructive solutions of Ukrainian domestic and foreign political problems. On contrary, there is an open goading into illegal unsavoury sabotage attacks, which could just worsen the plight of Kiev.

At least they offer rapid development of the Ukrainian paper making industry. The third paragraph of the part for creation information support on the internal political front runs about issuing a vast number of

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[2 captures](#)

29 Aug 2016 - 21 Nov 2017

on the heads of Allies in the UK, Belgium and Holland during the WWII. At once the Pierian spring of the StratCom has been found.